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Conspiracy theories ran wild during the 2016 American presidential election.  
According to one theory, rival candidate Hillary Clinton was going to rig the election 
with the help of the biased media.  According to another long-standing theory that re-
surfaced at the time, Barack Obama was not a legitimate president because he was 
born in Kenya.  Perhaps the most elaborate conspiracy theory was ÒpizzagateÓ 
involving allegations that Hillary Clinton and other prominent Democrats were 
involved in a secret pedophile ring run from a Washington DC pizza restaurant.  The 
most prominent supporter of these conspiracy theories was none other than Donald 
Trump, and he used conspiracy theories so much that he became known as the 
Òconspiracy candidateÓ.  Even since he won the election he has been making regular 
allegations of conspiracyÑmost recently that he was the target of a wire-tapping 
campaign authorized by Obama during the 2016 presidential race.   
 
The prominence of conspiracy theories during the US election campaign was echoed 
elsewhere too.  For example, conspiracy theories were a major feature of the 2016 EU 
referendum in the UK.  Politicians who changed camps during the campaign were 
alleged to be ÒsleepersÓ for the Remain side.  The voter registration website crash was 
apparently set up by the Remain campaign so that they could enroll more voters.  
Polling cards were allegedly being sent to non-British citizens to increase the vote for 
Remain.  Whilst it is of course commonplace for politicians to score points off each 
other using rumours and gossip, 2016 saw an unprecedented turn to conspiracy 
theories and this raises an important questionÑdo conspiracy theories have an effect 
on peopleÕs attitudes that might be enough to sway their vote?   
 
Recent experimental findings suggest that exposure to conspiracy theories may indeed 
change the way people think about social issues.  For example, one study showed that 
people believed conspiracy theories about the Death of Princess Diana more after 
reading unsubstantiated conspiracy-related material, but that they were unaware that 
their attitudes had changed.  In other words, the unfounded conspiracy theories 
changed their minds about the causes of the death of Princess Diana without them 
knowing about it.  This points to the potential for conspiracy theories to have an 
insidious effect on peopleÕs attitudes and behaviours.   
 
Other research has focused more specifically on the effects of conspiracy theories on 
political intentions.  In one study, people were presented with conspiracy theories 
about the government being involved in shady plots and schemes (e.g., that the British 
government assassinated Princess Diana; that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated by 
the US government), and were asked about their voting intentions in an upcoming 
election.  Findings showed that compared to a condition where participants were 
given anti-conspiracy material to read instead, the conspiracy theories reduced 
peopleÕs intentions to vote.  More specifically, people felt less inclined to vote 
because the conspiracy theories made them feel politically powerless.  Other studies 
using similar methods have shown that conspiracy theories also reduce peopleÕs 
engagement with climate change, vaccination and the workplace.   
 
The two important messages from this emerging research are that conspiracy theories 
seem to reduce engagement with important social systems like the government, and 
make people feel powerless or that their actions would make no difference.  In some 
of these studies, conspiracy theories also made people feel uncertain and 
disillusioned.  Therefore rather than empowering people to stand up and act on 
perceived injustices, conspiracy theories appear to make them disengage and instead 
do nothing.  They seem to erode trust in politicians and institutions and lead to apathy 
rather than action.  Why would people want to vote for a political system that they 
think is constantly committing crimes and hiding information from the public? 
 
But people might have other options to deal with these perceived injustices.  For 
example, if they do not want to vote for a system that they perceive to be unfair, they 
can instead engage in non-normative action, or action intended to change the system.  
One study in the aftermath of the Fukushima catastrophe showed that a general 
tendency to endorse conspiracy theoriesÑindependent of their contentÑwas linked to 
intentions to engage in individual protest (e.g., changing the energy supplier to 
renewable energies), normative collective protest (e.g., participating in a 
demonstration), and non-normative collective protest (e.g., blocking rail tracks of a 
nuclear waste transport in an act of civil disobedience).  Perhaps therefore conspiracy 
theories might reduce intentions to act politically in support of what is seen as a 
corrupt system but increase the tendency to change the status quo by other means that 
directly challenge the system.  More research is required to understand when 
conspiracy theories are likely to lead to apathy, and when they are likely to promote 
action to change the system. 
 
Another important question remains about the role of conspiracy theories in politics.  
Specifically, is it possible that politicians deliberately use conspiracy theories as a 
way to win or maintain power?  It would certainly appear as though they have some 
knowledge conspiracy theoriesÕ power to change peopleÕs attitudes.  Going back to 
the example of Donald Trump during the US election, his consistent use of conspiracy 
theories would suggest that he was using them deliberately to manipulate voters.  He 
regularly peddled ideas that would resonate with the suspicious of ordinary people 
(e.g., that Obama and his administration did not want to fight terrorism; or that they 
were actually aiding ISIS).  Although it is difficult to know if this use of conspiracy 
theories is deliberate, it is clear that 2016 was a pivotal year in politics and at the 
same time that it was riddled with political conspiracy theories.  Whether or not 
politicians use conspiracy theories as tools to increase their votes, or to keep the 
masses under control by reducing their vigilance and political engagement, remains 
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